Abstract. SOSEMANUK is a software-oriented stream cipher proposed by C. Berbain et al for the eSTREAM project and has been selected into the final portfolio. It is noticed that most components of SOSEMANUK can be calculated byte-oriented. Hence an attacker can observe SOSE-MANUK from the view of byte units instead of the original 32-bit word units. Based on the above idea, in this work we present a new byte-based guess and determine attack on SOSEMANUK, where we view a byte as a basic data unit and guess some certain bytes of the internal states instead of the whole 32-bit words during the execution of the attack. Surprisingly, our attack only needs a few words of known key stream to recover all the internal states of SOSEMANUK, and the time complexity can be dramatically reduced to O(2 176 ). Since SOSEMANUK has a key with the length varying from 128 to 256 bits, our results show that when the length of an encryption key is larger than 176 bits, our guess and determine attack is more efficient than an exhaustive key search.
Introduction
The European eSTREAM project [1] was launched in 2004 to call for stream ciphers and was ended in 2008. At first about 34 stream cipher candidates were submitted to the eSTREAM project, and after the challenge of three rounds, 7 of them were selected into the final portfolio. SOSEMANUK proposed by C. Berbain et al [2] is one of the above seven algorithms. SOSEMANUK is a software-oriented stream cipher and has a key with the length varying from 128 to 256 bits. The design of SOSEMANUK adopted the ideas of both the stream cipher SNOW 2.0 [3] and the block cipher SERPENT [4] , and aimed at improving SNOW 2.0 both from the security and from the efficiency points of view.
The guess and determine attack is a common attack on stream ciphers [5] [6] [7] [8] . Its main idea is that: an attacker first guesses the values of a portion of the internal states of the target algorithm, then it takes a little cost to deduce the values of all the rest of the internal states of the algorithm by making use of the values of the guessed portion of internal states and a few known key stream.
When the values of all the internal states of the algorithm are recovered, the attacker tests the correctness of these values by producing a key stream using the above recovered values and comparing it with the known key stream. If the key streams agree, it shows that the recovered states are correct. If the key streams don't agree, then the attacker repeats the above process until the correct internal states are found. As for SOSEMANUK, the designers of SOSEMANUK [2] presented a guess and determine attack method, whose time complexity is O(2 256 ). In 2006 H. Ahmadi et al [9] revised the attack and reduced the time complexity to O (2 226 ), and this result was further reduced to O (2 224 ) by Y. Tsunoo et al [10] . Recently Lin and Jie [11] gave a new result that they could recover all internal states of SOSEMANUK with time complexity O (2 192 It is known that most word-oriented stream ciphers make a trade-off between security and efficiency. From the view of a designer, for pursuit of more efficient software implementation of the algorithm, some certain operators, for example, the exclusive OR, S-boxes, the modulo 2 n addition, the multiplication or the division by a primitive element in the finite field F 2 n , where n may be equal to 8, 16 or 32, are often used. We notice that most of these operations can be done based on the smaller units, for example, 16-bit words or bytes. Therefore from the view of an attacker, he can observe the algorithm from the viewpoints of smaller units instead of the original word units. Based on the above idea, in this work we present a byte-based guess and determine attack on SOSEMANUK, where we view a byte as a basic data unit and guess some certain bytes of the internal states instead of the whole 32-bit words during the execution of the attack. Surprisingly, our attack only needs a few known key stream to recover all the internal states of SOSEMANUK, and the time complexity can be dramatically reduced to O (2 176 ). It shows that when the length of an encryption key is larger than 176 bits, the guess and determine attack is more efficient than an exhaustive key search. What's more, our results also show that during the design of stream cipher algorithms, it is necessary to break the bound between different operands.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we recall the SOSEMANUK algorithm briefly, and in section 3 we give some basic properties of SOSEMANUK. In section 4 we describe all the detail of our attack on SOSE-MANUK. In section 5 we give a estimate on the time and data complexity of our attack. Section 6 gives a further discussion, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
Description of SOMEMANUK
In this section we recall the SOSEMANUK algorithm briefly and all the details can be found in [2] .
SOSEMANUK is a 32-bit word-oriented stream cipher, and logically composed of three parts: a linear feedback shift register (LFSR), a finite state machine (FSM) and a round function Serpent1, see Figure 1 . 
The LFSR
The LFSR of SOSEMANUK is defined over the finite field F 2 32 , and contains 10 of 32-bit registers s i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 10. The feedback polynomial π(x) of LFSR is defined as follows:
where α is a root of the polynomial
over the finite field F 2 8 , and β is a root of the binary polynomial
Let { s t } t≥1 be a sequence generated by the LFSR. Then it satisfies
The FSM
The nonlinear filtering part of SOSEMANUK is a finite state machine (FSM), which contains two 32-bit memory units R1 and R2. At time t, the FSM takes the values s t+1 , s t+8 and s t+9 of registers s 1 , s 8 and s 9 of the LFSR as inputs, and outputs a 32-bit word f t . The execution of the FSM is as follows:
where is the modulo 2 32 addition; lsb(x) is the least significant bit of x; mux(c, x, y) is equal to x if c = 0, or equal to y if c = 1; and the internal transition function Trans on 32-bit integers is defined by
where ≪ is the left cyclic shift operator on 32-bit strings.
The round function Serpent1
In the block cipher SERPENT a raw SERPENT round consists of, in that order:
-a subkey addition; -S-boxes transformations; -a linear transformation.
Here the function Serpent1 is one round of SERPENT without the subkey addition and the linear transformation. The S-box used in Serpent1 is the S-box S 2 of SERPENT and runs in the bit-slice mode. Serpent1 takes outputs f t+i of the FSM at four successive times as inputs and outputs four 32-bit words y t+i , where i = 0, 1, 2, 3, see Figure 2 .
Generation of key stream
Let s t , s t+1 , s t+2 , s t+3 and f t , f t+1 , f t+2 , f t+3 be the outputs of the LFSR and that of the FSM respectively at the successive times starting from time t, and z t , z t+1 , z t+2 , z t+3 be the key words generated by SOSEMANUK at those four successive times. Then we have 
Some properties of SOSEMANUK
In this section we view a byte as a basic data unit and give some basic properties of SOSEMANUK from the view of byte units. First we introduce some notations.
Let x be a 32-bit word. We denote by
where each x (i) is a byte, and ∥ is the concatenation of two bit strings. For simplicity we write
For any given 32-bit word x, the word x may have the different meanings in different contexts as follows:
1. As an operand of the operator ⊕. Here x is a 32-bit string, and ⊕ is the bitwise exclusive OR. 2. As an operand of the integer addition + or the modulo 2 32 addition . Here x denotes the integer
3. As an element of the finite field F 2 32 . Here x denotes the element
, where α is defined as in equation (1). Now we consider the SOSEMANUK algorithm from the view of byte units. First we notice that the feedback calculation of the LFSR (see equation (2)) can be represented in the byte form.
Lemma 1. Equation (2) can be written in the byte form as follows:
Proof. By the definition of α, we have,
It follows that
t+3 α i . Then we have
Combine the above equations and equation (2), and we immediately get the desired conclusion.
Second we observe the update of R1 and the output of the FSM and have the following conclusions: 
Lemma 2. Equations (3) and (5) also hold in the sense of modulo
where 
Execution of the attack
In this section we always assume that a portion of key stream words { z t } have been observed, where t = 1, 2, · · · , N , and N is large enough for the attack to work. For convenience, we denote by
Before the description of the attack, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. The least significant bit of R1 1 is one, that is, lsb(R1 1 ) = 1.
The whole description of the attack on SOSEMANUK can be divided into five phases as follows. Step 1.1 We first deduce s
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In this phase we have obtained
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(0,1,2) 2 ≥ 2 24 , or c 2 = 0, otherwise. By the assumption lsb(R1 1 ) = 1, we have R1 2 = R2 1 (S 3 ⊕ S 10 ). It follows that R1
where
) ≥ 2 24 , or c 3 = 0, otherwise. Combine equations (8), (9), (10) and (11), and then we have the equation on the variable s (3) 10 :
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Phase 5. Finally we deduce s 9 as follows:
Up to now we have recovered all internal states s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s 10 , R1 1 and R2 1 of the SOSEMANUK algorithm. And then we test the correctness of those values by producing a key stream using the above recovered values and comparing it with the known key stream. If the key streams agree, it shows that the recovered states are correct. If the key streams don't agree, then we will repeat the above process until the correct internal states are found.
The process of the above attack is demonstrated in Table 1 .
On time and data complexities of our attack
The execution of the above attack needs to guess a total of 175 bits of the internal states, including 159 bits of the internal states at phase 1 and 16 bits at phase 4, and then all the rest of the internal states can be deduced under the assumption lsb(R1 1 ) = 1. Since the probability for lsb(R1 1 ) = 1 to hold is Step 1.1 s
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Note: R1 * 1 denotes the 31 bits of R11 from the second significant bit to the most significant bit.
only make use of 8 words of the known key stream, and during the verification we need about another 8 words of the known key stream to verify whether the guessed internal states are correct or not. Since by shifting the keystream by 4 words we can test two cases, thus the total data complexity is about 20 words of the known key stream.
6 Further discussion on the assumption lsb(R1 1 ) = 1
In the above attack, we make the assumption lsb(R1 1 ) = 1, which will guarantee that equation (12) in phase 2 has exactly one solution. However it should be pointed out that this assumption is not necessary for our attack to work. In fact, we directly guess the 160-bit values of s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 
10 :
3 + c 2 + c 4 mod 2 8 and 176 ). But without the assumption, the data complexity reduces to 16 words of the known key stream.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a byte-based guess and determine attack on SOSE-MANUK, which only needs a few words of key stream to recover all internal states of SOSEMANUK with time complexity O (2 176 ). The results show that when the length of an encryption key is larger than 176 bits, the guess and determine attack is more efficient than an exhaustive key search.
